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he 2007−09 financial crisis dramatically dem-
onstrated the interdependence between the 
financial sector and the real economy and 
the interconnectedness of the global economy. It 
became apparent that the existing policy models, 
which treat the banking sector as a passive element 
in the economy—simply intermediating funds from 
savers to borrowers—could not explain the causes 






Indeed, the crisis triggered a wave of studies aimed 
at incorporating an active banking system into stan-
dard macroeconomic models. This article describes 
one such initiative, the Bank of Canada’s version of 
the Global Economy Model with Financial Frictions 
(BoC-GEM-Fin).
1
The two key-features of the model are (i) a multi-
regional dimension and (ii) the explicit modelling of 
the interaction between the banking system and 
the real economy. A multi-region model captures 
the spillover of shocks across economies. With all 
of the regional blocks connected by bilateral trade, 
exchange rates and financial linkages, the inter-
national transmission of shocks is an important 
propagation mechanism. In addition, rather than 
being a frictionless bridge between savers and 
1  Other studies conducted at the Bank, even prior to the financial crisis, 
that highlight the importance of financial channels for the macroecon-
omy include Christensen and Dib (2006), Meh and Moran (2010) and 
Christensen, Meh and Moran (2010).
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important roles: propagating, even amplifying, the 
effects of real shocks; and serving as sources of 
financial shocks. Cross-border lending by banks pro-
vides an additional mechanism for the international 
transmission of shocks. These features not only add 
realism to the model, but also permit the study of 
the international transmission of shocks (including 
banking sector shocks), monetary policy in the pres-
ence of banking-system distress and the macro-
economic effects of bank regulation.
The article is organized as follows. First we describe 
the model, focusing on the banking sector. We then 
present the response of selected Canadian and U.S. 
macroeconomic variables to a “credit crunch” (i.e., 
an exogenous reduction in the supply of loans) in the 
United States and discuss recent related research 
based on BoC-GEM-Fin. We conclude with a look at 
future development and applications of the model.
BoC-GEM-Fin
The BoC-GEM-Fin follows the Bank’s long tradition of 
using state-of-the-art economic models as analytical 
tools in the policy-decision-making process.
2 The 
model is a multi-sector dynamic stochastic general-
equilibrium (DSGE) model in which economic agents 
make consumption, savings, pricing and production 
decisions based on optimizing behaviour. In this class 
of models, the supply and demand profiles for goods, 
labour, capital and financial assets are explicitly mod-






The model features a multi-region world economy 
in which bilateral trade and exchange rates are fully 
endogenous.
3 The five regional blocks are Canada, 
the United States, emerging Asia, the commodity-
exporting countries and the rest of the world.
4 The 
2  See Duguay and Longworth (1998).
3  The model builds on a previous version, BoC-GEM (Lalonde and Muir 
2007, 2009), which itself is based on the original GEM developed at the 
International Monetary Fund. See Pesenti (2008).
4  The residual economy represents the European Union (EU), Japan 
and Africa. A six-region version of the model, with a separate block for 
Japan, is currently under development.
prices of oil and non-energy commodities are deter-
mined in global markets, providing an important 
mechanism for the transmission of foreign shocks, 
particularly to commodity-oriented economies, 
such as Canada. Each regional block consists of 
households; a multi-tiered production sector, which 
includes risk-neutral entrepreneurs, capital produ-
cers, monopolistically competitive retail firms and 
perfectly competitive wholesale firms; and a fiscal 
and a monetary authority.
5, 6
The calibration of the model’s parameters—to map 
the model to the data—is described in more detail 
in Lalonde and Muir (2007) and de Resende et al. 
(forthcoming). In general, calibration is based on the 
statistical properties of relevant data, as well as on 
values estimated in microeconomic studies and used 
in other DSGE models.
This article focuses on two key changes in the BoC-
GEM-Fin, relative to the previous version of the model 
(BoC-GEM); namely the introduction of (i) the so-
called “financial-accelerator mechanism” (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist 1999) and (ii) active banks that 
interact in an interbank market and lend to domestic 
and foreign entrepreneurs, based on Dib (2010 a, 
b). Below, we briefly describe the changes intro-
duced to the real side of the economy, focusing on 
households and entrepreneurs—where the supply 
and demand of credit originate, respectively—and 
then describe the banking sector—where supply and 





Households work, consume final goods and save. 
Savings can be held in domestic and U.S. govern-
ment bonds, domestic bank deposits and domestic 
bank capital. Deposits and bank capital are the pri-
mary source of funds for intermediation in the banking 
system, where they become loans to finance invest-
ment projects. This linkage between households’ 
savings and loans to entrepreneurs—through the 
banking system—is a major component of the supply 
5  The government levies taxes and spends on non-tradable, consumption 
and investment goods, while the monetary authority follows a Taylor-
type rule in reaction to core inflation.
6  The production structure is essentially the same as that in the BoC-
GEM.
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changes relative to the previous version.
Entrepreneurs purchase capital using their own 
resources—entrepreneurial	net	worth—and bank 
loans. They rent the purchased capital to firms, 
where it will be used to produce goods. While the 
link from savings to loans is important for the supply 
of credit, the entrepreneurs’ decisions determine 
the demand for credit.
7 Because capital purchases 
require some external funding (bank loans), the 
demand for credit in the BoC-GEM-Fin is directly 
tied to the entrepreneurs’ demand for capital. Any 
disruption to the credit supply reduces the funds 
available to entrepreneurs, depressing investment 
and output.
The loan contract between entrepreneurs and banks 
reflects a source of financial	friction, namely asym-
metric	information. In particular, entrepreneurs 
experience shocks to investment projects that only 
they—not the banks—observe. Thus, borrowing 
entrepreneurs know the return on their investment, 
but banks do not. This lack of information is costly 
for banks because when an adverse shock is severe 
enough—an unsuccessful investment project— 
entrepreneurs may default on bank loans. Banks can 
pay a monitoring cost (e.g., credit-risk specialists) to 
help identify the threshold level of the shock that trig-
gers default and, in the event of default, pay agency 
costs (e.g., lawyers) to retrieve part of the principal 
plus the liquidation value of the unsuccessful project.
A contract that resolves the problem of asymmetric 
information must constrain the amount of loans 
desired by entrepreneurs, while fully compensating 
the banks for the risks involved. Note that, for a given 
value of entrepreneurial net worth, a greater desire to 
purchase capital implies that entrepreneurs must rely 
increasingly on loans to fund their projects. From the 
bank’s viewpoint, this increases the risk associated 
with the loan. In the BoC-GEM-Fin, the loan contract 
implies a risk premium that depends inversely on the 
entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio, i.e., the ratio between 
loans and internal funding (net worth).
8
The banking system
The banking sector within the BoC-GEM-Fin is 
based on Dib (2010a, b) and features two types of 
optimizing, monopolistic competitive banks: deposit	
7  Entrepreneurs are solely responsible for the demand for credit in the 
economy. Future versions of the model will include credit to households.
8  The relationship between the risk premium and net worth is captured by 
a reduced-form equation, following Dib (2010a, b).
banks and lending	banks. These two types of banks 
may be thought of as single banks, each having two 
distinct profit-maximizing operational divisions. One 
division acts purely as a deposit bank, collecting fully 
insured deposits from households, paying a deposit 
interest rate and optimally allocating the deposits 
into two types of assets: risky interbank loans or 
government bonds. The second division, a corporate 
loans division, acts as a lending bank, using the 
funds borrowed from its own depositors and other 
domestic banks, together with bank capital raised 
from households, to supply loans to entrepreneurs 
(domestic and foreign), and charging a lending 
interest rate.
Deposit banks allocate deposits between domestic 
interbank lending and domestic government bonds. 
Given their asset portfolio, the rate of return earned 
by deposit banks is a weighted average of the risk-
adjusted interbank rate and the rate on government 
bonds. The financial frictions affecting deposit banks 
are the monitoring and agency costs associated with 
potential default on interbank loans. The monopoly 
power of individual banks determines the deposit 
rate as a markdown over the net marginal return on 
their assets. The distortions introduced by the prob-
ability of default and the monopoly power of banks 
create a wedge between the deposit rate and the 
interbank rate. Optimization motivates deposit banks 
to allocate a higher share of deposits to risky inter-
bank loans when the interbank rate increases relative 
to the rate on government bonds, and as either the 
probability of default on interbank loans or the mar-
ginal costs associated with monitoring and agency 
issues decrease.
Lending banks borrow in the interbank market and 
raise bank capital. Banks use these funds to provide 
loans to entrepreneurs. From the viewpoint of house-
holds, bank capital is a risky asset whose return 
is uncertain because the gross return is known 
only after the investment decision takes place, 
and lending banks may divert their profits to non-
productive activities (e.g., large bonuses for bank 
managers) instead of paying the expected return to 
investors. During intermediation, lending banks opti-
mally decide the lending rate, the share of borrowed 
funds that will not be repaid (default on interbank 
loans), the fraction of the return on bank capital that 
will be diverted, the demand for bank capital and the 
supply of loans.
9
9  The BoC-GEM-Fin, unlike the previous version, provides implications 
for multiple interest rates: deposit, lending, interbank and policy rates.
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power allows lending banks to set rates as a markup 
over their marginal cost (i.e., the costs of interbank 
borrowing and raising bank capital). Financial fric-
tions also apply to lending banks when deciding 
(i) the optimal share of interbank loans to be 
defaulted and (ii) the optimal fraction of the return 
on bank capital to be diverted. These decisions may 
result in legal costs and fees that increase with the 
amounts involved. The higher these penalties are, the 
less the likelihood of default and/or diverted returns. 
However, a higher policy interest rate increases the 
net benefit of default and the likelihood of profits 
being diverted. These distortions generate a wedge 
between the interbank rate and the lending rate, and 
affect the propagation of shocks in the model.
When lending banks decide their optimal demand 
for bank capital and the amount of loans supplied 
to entrepreneurs, they are, in fact, determining 
their desired bank	leverage	ratio, defined as the 
ratio of loans to bank capital. The optimal bank 
leverage ratio decreases as the lending rate rises 
(less demand for loans in equilibrium) and increases 
with the marginal cost of raising bank capital (less 
bank capital in equilibrium). In the BoC-GEM-Fin, 
lending banks must satisfy a maximum leverage ratio 
(or minimum capital requirement) established by 
regulators. Agents use this regulatory cap on bank 
leverage to benchmark banks’ current capital ratio, 
so that well-capitalized banks (i.e., less leveraged) 
can issue equity at a lower cost. Thus, banks have 
an incentive to keep a “capital buffer” above the 
minimum required by regulation. As well, the upper 
limit on leverage becomes an additional instrument 
available to policy-makers, and changes in that limit 
have important implications for bank behaviour, 
affecting the supply of loans, interest rates, invest-
ment and output. If banks exceed that limit, they 
must deleverage, either by reducing risky loans or by 
raising additional bank capital.
10 
In the BoC-GEM-Fin, the banking sector also plays 
an important role in the international transmission 
of shocks. Without the banking system, shocks ori-
ginating in one region propagate to another region 
exclusively through bilateral trade flows, adjust-
ments in exchange rates and changes in the prices 
of oil and non-energy commodities. The presence 
of cross-border lending in the BoC-GEM-Fin means 
that changes in credit conditions in one region 
10 The gain from keeping more capital than required by the regulation of 
leverage ratio, as well as the agency and monitoring costs, in the bank-
ing system of the BoC-GEM-Fin is captured in a reduced form, following 
Dib (2010a, b). 
will affect borrowing costs in another region, with 
consequences for investment and output beyond 






The demand for credit depends heavily on entrepre-
neurial net worth. Wealthier entrepreneurs require 
fewer bank loans for their projects. However, the 
lower cost of external financing because of greater 
net worth induces a higher demand for loans. Net 
worth has two important properties: (i) it is pro-
cyclical; i.e., it tends to increase with profits and 
asset prices, which in turn, rise during economic 
booms and fall during recessions; and (ii) it is per-
sistent, since it takes time to accumulate. Given 
the loan contract described earlier, these proper-
ties imply movements in the risk premium that are 
countercyclical and long lasting, contributing to the 
amplification and propagation of shocks. Consider, 
for example, a demand-driven economic boom that 
increases consumption, output and profits, and 
leads to greater entrepreneurial net worth. New loan 
contracts reflect the reduction in the banks’ exposure 
to risk, and entrepreneurs pay lower risk premiums. 
As external funding becomes more affordable, 
entrepreneurs invest more, inducing a second-round 
boost to aggregate demand, output and net worth, 
which reduces the risk premium even further, and so 
on. The initial demand shock is amplified through the 
interaction of banks and entrepreneurs. This is the 
financial-accelerator mechanism.
The debt-deflation mechanism is another channel 
affecting the demand for credit and the propaga-
tion of shocks in the BoC-GEM-Fin. Since all debt 
contracts, including bank loans, are denominated in 
nominal terms, unanticipated price-level increases 
depress the real value of debt. Wealth is trans-
ferred from creditors to debtors. Therefore, higher 
unexpected inflation increases the net worth of 
indebted entrepreneurs, reduces the risk premium 
and increases investment and output. Notice that 
11 The international financial channels may still not be fully captured in the 
current version of the model, which features only direct cross-border 
lending to entrepreneurs but not lending between banks in different 
regions. Bank staff are working on a future version that will incorporate 
international interbank lending.
14
THE BOC-GEM-FIN: BANKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011this channel reinforces the financial-accelerator 
mechanism following demand shocks that drive up 
both output and inflation, but dampens its effect 
after a positive supply shock that raises output but 
reduces inflation.
On the supply side of credit, the main mechanism 
at work is the bank-capital channel. Shocks that 
affect asset prices also alter the value of bank cap-
ital. To keep their capital-adequacy ratio within regu-
latory limits and adjust the desired capital buffer, 
banks optimally change their actual leverage ratio. 
This has implications for the supply of loans, which 
in turn, will affect investment and output. 
Model Properties and Policy 
Experiments
Shocks to the U.S. banking sector
To illustrate some of the models’ properties, we 
examine the response of selected variables to an 
exogenous persistent fall in the supply of loans in 
United States.
12 The shock can be interpreted as 
an exogenous tightening of credit standards in the 
United States, as observed during the recent finan-
cial crisis—a “credit crunch.” Our discussion focuses 
on the responses of the U.S. and the Canadian 
economies.
In the United States, such a drop in the supply of 
loans leads to increases in both the U.S. lending 
rate and the risk premium, a fall in investment and a 
recession (Chart 1). Since borrowing becomes more 
expensive, entrepreneurs reduce their purchases of 
capital goods. The corresponding decline in invest-
ment leads to lower economic activity and inflation. 
As household income falls, consumption follows. 
With less demand for goods and lower sales, the 
demand for capital decreases, and entrepreneurial 
net worth starts falling, inducing a second-round 
increase in the risk premium (financial-accelerator 
mechanism). In addition, the unanticipated decrease 
in U.S. inflation raises the real value of entrepreneurs’ 
bank loans (debt-deflation mechanism), reinforcing 
the initial fall in net worth and adding to the initial 
increase in the risk premium. Both mechanisms 
amplify the decline in economic activity.
13
The tighter credit conditions in the United States are 
transmitted to Canada (and other regions) through 
12 For a detailed description of the response of the model to other stylized 
shocks, see de Resende et al. (forthcoming).
13 The reaction of monetary policy to lower inflation—a reduction in inter-
est rates—partially offsets the full impact of the credit crunch.
three channels (Chart 2). First, the decline in U.S. 
economic activity reduces U.S. imports from all 
regions, negatively affecting output abroad—the 
traditional trade channel. This is especially true for 
Canada, given its close trade relationship with the 
United States. Second, slower economic activity 
in the United States and in the rest of the world 
reduces the demand for oil and non-energy com-
modities. The prices of these commodities fall, 
creating a negative wealth effect in commodity-
exporting regions like Canada. This commodity-price 
channel exacerbates the decrease in Canadian con-
sumption and output. These two channels reduce 
the net worth of Canadian entrepreneurs, triggering 
the financial-accelerator mechanism, which generates   
negative second-round effects on Canadian invest-
ment and output. As inflation falls in Canada, the 
debt-deflation mechanism further amplifies the eco-
nomic downturn. Note that the larger decrease in 
U.S. output (and inflation) relative to that in Canada 
leads to a larger drop in U.S. policy rates. This differ-
ence in interest rates causes the Canadian dollar to 
appreciate in real terms against the U.S. dollar in the 
short term. Eventually, the effect of lower commodity 







The third transmission channel is the bilateral flow of 
bank loans. Since Canadian entrepreneurs finance 
some of their capital acquisition by borrowing from 
U.S. lending banks, the U.S. credit crunch directly 
affects their access to external funding.
14 Beaton, 
Lalonde and Snudden (2010) show that this channel 
typically explains roughly 20 per cent of the fall in 
Canadian output that follows the reduction in U.S. 
loans.
15 Consistent with the observations of the 
recent financial crisis, simulations with the BoC-
GEM-Fin suggest that the transmission of shocks 
14 Because the shares of loans demanded by domestic entrepreneurs 
from domestic and foreign banks are currently fixed, Canadian banks 
do not make up for the loss in loans supplied by foreign banks. A future 
version of the model will allow those shares to be optimally decided.
15 In this case, the fall in Canadian output is about two-thirds of that in 
U.S. output.
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Chart 1:  Effects on the United States of an exogenous reduction in U.S. bank loans
Deviation from control
a. Bank loans  b. Policy rate







e. Net worth f. Risk premiums
 Tradables  Non-tradables  Tradables  Non-tradables
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Deviation from control
g. Price of oil and non-oil commodities  h. Total U.S. imports
Source: BoC-GEM-Fin simulations 



























 Price of oil  Price of non-energy commodities
Source: BoC-GEM-Fin simulations 











































Chart 2:  Effects on Canada of an exogenous reduction in U.S. bank loans
Deviation from control
a. Exchange rate  b. Exports
 Bilateral $US/$Can  
c. Output d. GDP, Canada and United States
 Consumption  Investment  GDP (Canada)  GDP (U.S.)
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economy—particularly Canada—is very important. 
Similar conclusions hold for other types of shocks 
to the U.S. banking sector, such as increases in the 
probability of default in the interbank market (i.e., the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers). 
Recent applications of the BoC-GEM-Fin
The global economic and financial dimensions of the 
recent crisis have raised many questions that can be 
better addressed by a model of the global economy 
with financial frictions, like the BoC-GEM-Fin. 
The role of real-financial linkages in propagating 
U.S. shocks to Canada 
The importance of cross-border financial linkages is 
illustrated by Beaton, Lalonde and Snudden (2010), 
who use the BoC-GEM-Fin to address two questions:
1.  How are U.S. banking sector shocks transmitted to 
the Canadian economy?
2.  What is the role of financial frictions in the trans-
mission of real shocks originating in the United 
States to the Canadian economy?
The authors simulate two types of shocks to the U.S. 
banking sector: (i) a reduction in the supply of bank 
loans and (ii) an increase in the probability of default 
in the interbank market. To answer question 2, the 
authors simulate demand and productivity shocks in 
the U.S. economy and compare the responses of the 
U.S. and Canadian economies with those obtained 
when financial frictions are excluded from the model.
The results suggest that the shocks to the U.S. 
banking sector have important effects on credit 
conditions and real activity in Canada. As discussed 
previously, the response of Canadian output to 
shocks in the U.S. banking sector is sizable and can 
be explained by channels associated with the real 
side of the economy and with the international flow 
of bank loans. Moreover, financial frictions from the 
Source: BoC-GEM-Fin simulations 












































Chart 2:  Effects on Canada of an exogenous reduction in U.S. bank loans (cont’d)
Deviation from control
e. Core infl  ation  f. Policy rate
g. Net worth h. Risk premiums
 Tradables  Non-tradables  Tradables  Non-tradables
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accelerator) of credit can amplify the responses of 
the U.S. and Canadian economies to all types of 
shocks that affect U.S. real variables. One final result 
illustrates how the financial shocks and frictions 
in the BoC-GEM-Fin help to explain the observed 
positive co-movement between consumption and 
investment within each economy and between the 
two economies. Explaining these co-movements is 
notoriously difficult with models that rely on only the 
traditional trade linkages.
Inflation targeting versus price-level targeting: 
banking sector shocks and the lower bound on 
interest rates
The Bank of Canada has recently conducted several 
studies on the merits of the current monetary policy 
framework based on inflation targeting (IT), relative 
to a framework based on a price-level target (PLT). 
These studies (for example, Coletti and Lalonde 
2007–08; Kryvtsov, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt 2008) 
focus mainly on the responses to standard real 
shocks, and do not consider shocks originating in 
the banking system. The choice between IT and PLT 
received renewed interest during the recent crisis, and 
it has been suggested that PLT might be more suc-
cessful in limiting the variability in inflation and eco-
nomic activity when the desired policy rate is close to 
the zero lower bound (Ambler 2009).
Beaton, Evans and Lalonde (forthcoming) analyze the 
relative performance of the two regimes in reducing 
the variance of inflation and the output gap in the 
presence of shocks to the U.S. and Canadian banking 
sectors. In light of the recent global crisis, it is cru-
cial to understand the relative merits of IT/PLT under 
shocks to the banking system, something that could 
not be accomplished with previous versions of the 
model. 
Their results confirm previous findings that, in the 
context of monetary policy based on optimized 
interest rate rules, PLT generates more macro-
economic stability than IT when the economy is hit 
by shocks that cause inflation and output to move in 
the same direction, such as demand shocks. Those 
shocks, like banking sector shocks, imply a more 
favourable trade-off between inflation and output 
gap variability faced by the central bank (Coletti and 
Lalonde 2007–08). 
Because the new model incorporates the banking 
system, the authors consider the best monetary 
policy response under both IT and PLT in the event 
of a “banking crisis” that pushes nominal interest 
rates close to the zero lower bound. Their results 
suggest that, with PLT, the trough in the output gap 
and inflation during a banking crisis would be sub-
stantially reduced, relative to IT. The explanation is 
that when nominal interest rates are close to zero, 
the only practical way to reduce the real interest 
rate (i.e., the nominal interest rate minus expected 
inflation) and mitigate the fall in output is by gen-
erating higher expected inflation, something more 
easily achieved under PLT. The lower real interest 
rate under PLT, relative to IT, reduces the severity 
of the recession. Finally, depending on the severity 
of the crisis, the authors find evidence that, under 
PLT, policy rates need to be maintained at the lower 
bound for a shorter period.
16 The benefit of PLT in 
the presence of banking sector shocks is also asso-
ciated with the fact that PLT is better at minimizing 
the distortions caused by the debt-deflation mech-
anism on risk premiums (Dib, Mendicino and Zhang 
2008).
Regulation of bank capital 
Following the recent financial crisis, policy-makers 
investigated policies to mitigate the destabilizing 
effects of excessive leverage in the banking system. 
One important aspect of the “macroprudential rules” 
currently being considered is the implementation of 
tighter bank-capital requirements.
17 Using the BoC-
GEM-Fin, de Resende, Dib and Perevalov (2010) 
study the short-term cost of this type of regulatory 
policy for Canada. The size of the change and timing 
of implementation follow the discussions of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III (BCBS 
2010; BIS 2010). The authors show that a permanent 
increase of 2 percentage points in the minimum 
capital-to-loans ratio (i.e., a lower cap on the banks’ 
leverage ratio) imposed on banks in all regions pro-
duces the following results:
•  Canadian output falls because of an increase in the 
risk premium and a decrease in investment. This 
temporary effect on output reduces the long-term 
benefits—mainly the lower probability of a severe 
banking crisis—associated with the tighter regula-
tion.
18
16 Note that these results are robust to optimized rules that exclude the 
“smoothing coefficient” (i.e., a response to the lagged interest rate). 
These results are not unconditional, however, since they hold for the 
particular type of shock in queston (i.e., the banking sector shock) but 
not necessarily for other types of shocks. The PLT/IT comparison also 
abstracts from many of the challenges that PLT might face in practice, 
for example, credibilty and communicating it to the public.
17 See BCBS (2010), BIS (2010) and Gauthier, He and Souissi (2010)
18 See the interim report by the BCBS (BIS 2010). In addition, Bank of 
Canada (2010) shows that after subtracting the estimated long-run and 
transition costs of requiring banks to carry more capital and liquidity, 
the net gains in present-value terms would be approximately 13 per cent 
of GDP.
19 
THE BOC-GEM-FIN: BANKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011Literature Cited
Ambler, S. 2009. “Is It Time for Price-Level 
Targeting?” Economic	Affairs, 29 (3): 35–39.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 2010. 
“Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the 
Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity 
Requirements.” Macroeconomic Assessment 
Group Interim Report (August).
Bank of Canada. 2010. “Strengthening 
International Capital and Liquidity Standards: 
A Macroeconomic Impact Assessment for 
Canada.” Bank of Canada Report (August).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
2010. “An Assessment of the Long-Term 
Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and 
Liquidity Requirements.” LEI Report (August).
Beaton, K., B. Evans and R. Lalonde. Forthcoming. 
“The Relative Merits of Inflation Targeting versus 
Price-Level Targeting: Banking Sector Shocks, 
Banking Crises and the Lower Bound of Interest 
Rates.” Bank of Canada Discussion Paper. 
Beaton, K., R. Lalonde and S. Snudden. 2010. 
“The Propagation of U.S. Shocks to Canada: 
Understanding the Role of Real-Financial 
Linkages.” Bank of Canada Working Paper 
No. 2010-40.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist. 1999. 
“The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative 
Business Cycle Framework.” In Handbook	of	
Macroeconomics, edited by J. Taylor and M. 
Woodford, 1341–93. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Christensen, I. and A. Dib. 2006. “Monetary Policy 
in an Estimated DSGE Model with a Financial 
Accelerator.” Bank of Canada Working Paper 
No. 2006-9. 
Christensen, I., C. Meh and K. Moran. 2010. “Bank 
Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Dynamics.” Bank of Canada and Université 
Laval. Manuscript.
Coletti, D. and R. Lalonde. 2007–08. “Inflation 
Targeting, Price-Level Targeting, and 
Fluctuations in Canada’s Terms of Trade.” Bank	
of	Canada	Review (Winter): 35–43.
•  When the changes in regulatory policy are imple-
mented worldwide, the temporary drop in Canadian 
output is larger than it would be if the changes were 
introduced only in Canada. These spillover effects 
may increase the average negative effect on Can-
adian output by as much as 0.9 percentage point.
•  Reducing the phase-in period for implementation 
of the new regulatory policy from four years to two 
years implies an additional decrease of 0.3 per-
centage point in output. Increasing the phase-in 
to six years reduces the decrease in output by 
0.1 percentage point.
•  The monetary policy response is very import-
ant. If monetary policy does not react to inflation 
outcomes for one year,
19 such that the policy rate 
does not fall as fast as it would otherwise, the re-
sulting higher real interest rate increases the nega-
tive effect of the change in capital regulation.
19 That is, either by lowering the policy rate or by using quantitative- or 
credit-easing instruments in response to the decline in inflation resulting 
from the slowdown in economic activity.
Conclusions and Future 
Developments
The BoC-GEM-Fin is currently being used to study 
a number of interesting policy questions, including 
the relative merits of countercyclical bank-capital 
requirements—i.e., rules that allow banks to have 
more leverage during recessions, with stricter 
requirements during economic booms—as well as 
the macroeconomic effects of a monetary policy 
framework based on leaning against financial 
imbalances.
The BoC-GEM-Fin has already proven to be a very 
useful analytic tool, and further improvements are 
being incorporated. These include an international 
interbank market and household credit. These addi-
tional features will provide new channels for the 
international propagation of real and financial shocks 
and allow a more in-depth study of the behaviour 
of household balance sheets in times of financial 
distress. 
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